Defense against Res Ipsa in Medical Malpractice by Rossen, Howard M.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1964
Defense against Res Ipsa in Medical Malpractice
Howard M. Rossen
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Medical Jurisprudence Commons, and the Torts Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Howard M. Rosen, Defense against Res Ipsa in Medical Malpractice, 13 Clev.-Marshall L. Rev. 128 (1964)
Defense Against Res Ipsa in Medical
Malpractice
Howard M. Rossen*
N A res ipsa loquitur case the injured party is deemed in no
position to explain the cause, while the party charged may be
in a position to show himself free from negligence. If the plain-
tiff has equal or superior means of information, the doctrine does
not apply.1
The question is really one of duty on the part of the defend-
ant. Res ipsa loquitur leads only to a possible (not mandatory)
inference that the defendant has not complied with his duty to
use skill and care, and is not in itself proof that he was under a
specific duty. This question of duty often arises in cases of med-
ical malpractice.2 A physician or surgeon normally undertakes
to exercise the skill and care common to the medical profession.
A mistaken diagnosis, or an accident which happens in spite of
all reasonable precautions ordinarily are not enough to show the
necessary lack of skill and care.3 Laymen usually are not quali-
fied to say that a good doctor would not go wrong. Expert testi-
mony is indispensable before negligence can be found, except in
a few unusual cases.
4
The doctrine may not be invoked merely because a patient
is not cured or because aggravation follows treatment. Common
experience teaches that cure is never certain and aggravation is
possible even though proper care is used. A doctor is neither a
* A.B., University of Pittsburgh; Field Examiner, National Labor Relations
Board; Fourth-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1 2 Encyc. of Negligence § 478 (1962); Annot., 53 A. L. R. 1494 (1928); Note,
19 N. C. L. R. 617 (1941).
2 Note, 3 So. Cal. L. R. 131 (1929); Note, 40 Col. L. R. 161 (1940). The duty
standard is not that of the ordinary person. Barbire v. Wry, 75 N. J. Super.
327, 183 A. 2d 142 (1962).
3 Carroway v. Graham, 218 Ala. 453, 118 So. 807 (1928); Loudon v. Scott,
58 Mont. 645, 194 P. 488 (1920); Boyce v. Brown, 51 Ariz. 416, 77 P. 2d 455
(1938); Meador v. Arnold, 264 Ky. 378, 94 S. W. 2d 626 (1936).
4 Skeffington v. Bradley, 115 N. W. 2d 303 (Mich. 1962); Anno. 141 A. L. R. 5;
Callahan v. Hahnemann Hospital, 1 Cal. 2d 477, 35 P. 2d 536 (1934); April
v. Peront, 88 N. H. 309, 188 A. 457 (1936); Nelson v. Murphy, 42 Wash. 2d
737, 258 P. 2d 472 (1953); See also Prosser, Law of Torts § 43, p. 210 (2nd ed.,
1955). But see (lay testimony accepted), Michaels v. Spiers, 144 S. 2d 835
(Fla. 1962). And see n. 12.
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1964
DEFENSE TO MALPRACTICE RES IPSA
warrantor of cures nor an insurer. 5 Where reasonable doubt ex-
ists as to the proper treatment to pursue, an inference of neg-
ligence is not ordinarily raised from honest mistakes or errors
in judgment.6 A physician or surgeon is held to the requisite de-
gree of learning, skill and ability necessary to the practice of his
profession, and which others similarly situated possess, and must
apply those facilities with ordinary care and diligence in every
case.
7
The basis for rejection of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
can best be illustrated by examining various court decisions.
In Quinley v. Cockes plaintiff alleged negligence on the part
of his physician, having received a fractured hip during an elec-
tric shock treatment. The plaintiff sought to apply the doctrine.
It appeared from plaintiff's own testimony that he knew that the
purpose of the electric shock was to throw him into a convulsion.
Plaintiff had been told about these treatments and knew that
they were very strenuous. In denying recovery the court stated
that the doctrine will not apply in malpractice cases where a sci-
entific exposition of the subject matter is essential. Plaintiff
failed to introduce evidence showing a lack of skill in administer-
ing the shock treatment or that he was given an excessive shock
of electricity. There was no evidence to show that the treatment
given differed in any way from that which is usual and custom-
ary by a skillful practitioner. In a situation of this kind there is
manifest need of a scientific exposition of the subject matter in
order for the court and jury to clearly understand the nature of
the treatment as well as the usual results that follow. The court
said that if it applied the doctrine in cases of this kind, the physi-
cian or surgeon would always be in fear of the result of scientific
treatment, knowing that he might have to defend his professional
reputation in open court.
If the maxim, res ipsa loquitur were applicable . . . and
a failure to cure were held to be evidence, however slight, of
5 Pendergraft v. Royster, 203 N. C. 384, 166 S. E. 285 (1932); Davis v. Pitt-
ner, 212 N. C. 680, 194 S. E. 97 (1937). Also, fright by medically warranted
advice is not actionable. Kraus v. Spielberg, 37 Misc. (N. Y.) 2d 519 (Supr.
Ct., Kings Co. 1962).
6 Brewer v. Ring, 177 N. C. 476, 99 S. E. 358 (1919).
7 Mullinax v. Hord, 174 N. C. 607, 94 S. E. 426 (1917); Nash v. Royster, 189
N. C. 408, 127 S. E. 356 (1925).
8 183 Tenn. 428, 192 S. W. 2d 992 (1946). As to what is proper warning of
dangers involved, see, Williams v. Menehen, 370 P. 2d 292 (Kans. 1963);
Govin v. Hunter, 374 P. 2d 421 (Wyo. 1962).
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol13/iss1/14
13 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (1)
negligence on the part of the physician or surgeon causing
the bad result, few would be courageous enough to practice
the healing art, for they would have to assume financial li-
ability for nearly all the ills that flesh is heir toY
In a Pennsylvania case, where the plaintiff was struck on
the knee by a spark from a machine while having her teeth x-
rayed, the doctrine was rejected. The court held that, because
the medical profession must occasionally employ dangerous
agencies, to attach a presumption of negligence to their use would
make the doctor an insurer of his patient.' 0
Courts have also rejected the doctrine in cases involving
diagnosis. In an Ohio decision, plaintiff sued the defendant
physician, who limited his practice to radiology, for injuries al-
legedly resulting from defendant's malpractice. Plaintiff alleged
that the defendant was negligent in subjecting her to x-ray ther-
apy when he knew or should have known that her physical con-
dition did not require said therapy; and that said treatment was
highly dangerous and likely to result in severe injury to the skin
and tissues of plaintiff's body. The court stated that the doctrine
is seldom applicable in cases involving diagnosis and scientific
treatment." Furthermore, the doctrine cannot be invoked in aid
of specific charges of negligence, and is inapplicable where the
complaint alleged and plaintiff affirmatively showed how her
injuries were inflicted.
In a recent Texas decision, plaintiff brought an action for
alleged failure to properly diagnose her condition after an oper-
ation. Plaintiff was unconscious when injury occurred to a part
of the body upon which no surgery was being performed. Plain-
tiff's contention failed because there was no probative evidence
that the pinpoint hole in the ureter appeared at the time she was
under anesthesia or that defendant caused it by the use of clamps
or other surgical tools. The court stated that the law entertains,
9 Ewing et al. v. Goode, 78 Fed. 442, 443 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1897); Note, 26
Notre Dame Law. 756 (1951).
10 Nixon et ux. v. Pfahler, 279 Pa. 377, 124 A. 130 (1924); Accord: Malila v.
Meacham, 187 Ore. 330, 211 P. 2d 747 (1949) where the court stated at page
757: "A physician or dentist is not a warrantor of cures, and the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur does not apply in malpractice cases:" See also -Johnson
v. Colp, 211 Minn. 245, 300 N. W. 791 (1941) where the court held that in a
malpractice action by a patient against a physician, failure on the part of
the physician by treatment and operation to effect a cure was not grounds
for applying res ipsa loquitur, since such failure occurs under the most
skillful and careful treatment.
11 Sieling v. Mahrer, 71 Ohio L. Abs. 571, 113 N. E. 2d 373 (Ohio App. 1953).
No duty to diagnose rare medical difficulties accurately. Willard v. Hutson,
378 P. 2d 565 (Ore. 1963).
Jan., 1964
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in favor of a physician, the presumption that he has discharged
his full duty. To defeat this presumption the law exacts affirm-
ative proof of breach of duty coupled with affirmative proof that
such breach resulted in injury. To warrant the finding of civil
malpractice there must be expert medical testimony to establish
it.12
In a 1962 California case,13 defendant, a specialist in gyne-
cology, assisted by a general surgeon, performed a hysterectomy
on the plaintiff. After the operation, plaintiff was found to have
a vesicovaginal fistula. 14 Plaintiff instituted action, but did not
call expert witnesses. As her basis for invoking res ipsa loquitur,
plaintiff relied on defendant's answer that usually when a gyne-
cologist exercised that degree of skill and care ordinarily exer-
cised by reputable gynecologists, a fistula does not follow a hys-
terectomy, and that a fistula is an uncommon complication. The
court held that to permit an inference of negligence under the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur solely because an uncommon com-
plication develops would place too great a burden upon the
medical profession and might result in an undesirable limitation
on the use of procedures involving an inherent risk of injury
even when due care is used. When risks are inherent in an oper-
ation and a rare injury does occur, the doctrine should not be
applied unless it can be said, that in the light of past experience,
such an occurrence is more likely the result of negligence than
of some cause for which the defendant is not responsible. 15
When a physician or surgeon is accused of negligence, the
law logically should require that the charge be supported by
some opinion evidence to a reasonable degree of certainty, ad-
vanced by a properly qualified medical expert. 16
The doctrine is inapplicable in malpractice actions when it
is invoked solely on the ground that the treatment was unsuccess-
12 Shockley v. Payne, 348 S. W. 2d 775 (Tex. Civ. App., 1961); Evans v.
Sarrall, 25 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1962); Barker v. Heaney et al., 82 S. W. 2d 417
(Tex. Civ. App., 1935); Bowles et al. v. Bourdon et al., 147 Tex. 608, 219
S. W. 2d 779 (1949); Floyd v. Michie, 11 S. W. 2d 657 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
And see n. 4.
13 Siverson v. Weber, 22 Cal. Reptr. 337, 372 P. 2d 97 (1962).
14 An opening through the wall of the bladder and vagina.
15 Siverson v. Weber, supra, note 13. See also, Dietze v. King, 184 F. Supp.
944 (D. C. E. D. Va. 1960).
16 See Quick v. Thurston, 290 F. 2d 360 (D. C. Cir. 1961); Jensen v. Limner,
260 Minn. 22, 108 N. W. 2d 705 (1961); Eckleberry v. Kaiser Foundation
Northern Hospitals, 226 Ore. 616, 359 P. 2d 1090 (1961); Marsh v. Pember-
ton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 347 P. 2d 1108 (1959); See also 11 Defense Law Journal
499 (1962).
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ful or terminated with poor or unfortunate results. This is in ac-
cord with the universally recognized propositions that the mere
fact of a poor or unsuccessful result does not in itself constitute
evidence of negligence, does not establish a prima facie case, and
does not shift to the defendant the necessity of carrying the
burden of proof or going forward with the evidence.' 7
The necessity of producing expert testimony in an action
based on application of the doctrine is shown in a recent Utah
case' s involving a blood transfusion which caused death to plain-
tiff's wife. The plaintiff sued on the theory of res ipsa loquitur.
The court referred to an early case in which the doctrine first
appeared. 19 In considering the rules set forth in this prior case,
the Supreme Court of Utah discussed blood transfusions at length
but found no evidence of negligence. Judgment for the defend-
ant was affirmed.2 0 The expert testimony revealed that even
when the best methods known to medical science are used in the
typing and matching of blood, hemolytic reactions 21 occur in one
to five per thousand transfusions and that death may result in
from 25 to 30 per cent of those suffering this reaction.22
The danger inherent in applying the doctrine to doubtful
cases has been graphically illustrated in cases in the area of x-
rays. Earlier cases treated an x-ray burn as prima facie evidence
17 Silverson v. Weber, 22 Cal. Rptr. 337, 372 P. 2d 97 (1962); Annot., 162
A. L. R. 1265 (1946).
Is Joseph v. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hospital, 10 Utah 2d 94, 348 P. 2d
935 (1960).
19 Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Reports 299 (1863). Plaintiff,
walking in a public street, was injured when a barrel of flour fell upon him
from the window above the defendant's shop. The court allowed recovery
and stated that the fact of its falling is prima facie evidence of negligence
and plaintiff is not bound to show that it could not fall without negligence,
but if there are any facts inconsistent with negligence, it is for the defend-
ant to prove them.
20 The court stated that the giving of blood transfusions has become a well
recognized means of medical therapy. Techniques employed in connection
with giving them are standardized. The hazard of an adverse reaction is
well known and res ipsa loquitur has been applied in some cases when the
evidence will sustain a finding that the wrong type of blood is actually
given.
21 Destruction of the red blood cells.
22 Ibid.; See also Merker v. Wood, 307 Ky. 331, 210 S. W. 2d 946 (1948),
where the court stated that the doctrine does not apply in malpractice cases
and plaintiff must prove negligence by expert testimony and must prove that
such negligence was the proximate cause of injury unless the subject matter
is within common knowledge of laymen in which case the testimony of ex-
perts is not required. And see, Becker v. Eisenstadt, 60 N. J. S. 240, 158 A.
2d 706 (1960).
Jan., 1964
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of negligence of the operator.23 As scientific knowledge of the
x-ray has progressed, it has been demonstrated that it is quite as
likely that the personal idiosyncrasy of the patient was the prox-
imate cause of the injury. A strong trend of authority is clearly
away from treating these as res ipsa loquitur cases.
24
The element of control as a requirement for recovery under
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been considered by many
courts. In the case of Morgensen v. Hicks25 plaintiff brought an
action against a physician, a pharmaceutical manufacturer, a
hospital and others for injuries sustained following the injection
of an anesthetic. One of the counts in plaintiff's petition was
based on res ipsa loquitur. The court treated the doctrine in a
lengthy analysis and set forth its component parts.26 In this case,
the doctor was not in full control of the instrumentalities in-
volved. He controlled the surgical instruments and the medicine,
but not the condition and reactions of his patient. Allergic re-
action of the plaintiff was an element beyond the control of de-
fendant. A doctor is in constant contact with the frailties, idio-
syncrasies, physical and mental weaknesses, and allergies of hu-
man nature. They may affect the condition, and yet are beyond
his control. 27 Recovery was denied.
28
In Blackman v. Zeligs,29 plaintiff charged the defendant with
negligence in the course of an operation to set her hipbone.
Plaintiff sustained burns on her back from chemicals used in the
operation, and sought to apply the doctrine. But here the defend-
ant did not have excusive control of the agency-the chemical-
that allegedly caused the injury. The operation was performed
23 Shockley v. Tucker, 127 Iowa 456, 103 N. W. 360 (1905); George v. Shan-
non, 92 Kan. 801, 142 Pac. 967 (1914); Jones v. Tri-State Telephone and
Telegraph Co., 118 Minn. 217, 136 N. W. 741 (1912); Annot., 57 A. L. R. 269
(1928).
24 Runyan v. Goodrum, 147 Ark. 481, 228 S. W. 397 (1921); Strett v. Hodg-
son, 139 Md. 137, 115 A. 27 (1921).
25 110 N. W. 2d 563 (Iowa, 1961).
26 Id. at page 565 the court describes the component parts as (1) The in-
strumentalities causing the injury must have been under the exclusive con-
trol of the defendants. (2) The happening of the injury must be such that
in the ordinary course of events it would not occur without lack of due
care on the part of the defendants.
27 Id. at 566.
28 The doctrine is rejected in the following cases: Berg v. Willett, 212 Iowa
1109, 232 N. W. 821 (1930); Prewitt v. Higgins, 231 Ky. 678, 22 S. W. 2d 115
(1929); Hawkins v. McCain, 239 N. C. 160, 79 S. E. 2d 493 (1954); Groce v.
Myers, 224 N. C. 165, 29 S. E. 2d 553 (1944); Whetstine v. Moravec, 228
Iowa 352, 291 N. W. 425 (1940).
29 90 Ohio App. 304, 47 0. 0. 393, 60 0. L. A. 568, 103 N. E. 2d 13 (1951).
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in a hospital selected by the plaintiff. The hospital prepared the
patient for the operation and furnished all the accessories, in-
cluding the chemicals required in the operation, and its em-
ployees applied the chemicals. Under these circumstances the
doctrine is not applicable because, even assuming that an infer-
ence could be drawn, such negligence could not be attributed to
the defendant.3 0
The element of control is considered in a 1961 Pennsylvania
decision.3 1 Plaintiff brought an action of trespass to recover dam-
ages for personal injuries resulting from the puncturing of the
esophagus in the course of a gastroscopic examination by the de-
fendant physician. Plaintiff proved that injury resulted from
the insertion of the gastroscope, but used no expert testimony
in attempting to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. An
involuntary nonsuit was entered. The Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania, in affirming, held that no presumption or inference of
negligence arises merely because medical care or a surgical op-
eration terminates in an unfortunate result which might have
occurred even though proper care and skill had been exercised.
3 2
In Gebhardt v. McQuille 33 the court, in refusing to apply
the doctrine where plaintiff alleged injury due to careless and
negligent treatment in setting fractured bones in their natural
position, stated that the rule is seldom applied to cases of mal-
practice by physicians or surgeons. The physical condition of the
patient, the nature of the injury-many things over which the
physician has no control-may enter into the case and affect the
result. 3
4
30 See 42 Ohio Jur. 2d, Physicians and Surgeons, Sec. 151 at 669 (1960); 39
Ohio Jur. 2d, Negligence, Sec. 155 at 747 (1959).
31 -Demchuk v. Bralow, 404 Pa. 100, 170 A. 2d 868 (1961); See also Robinson
v. Wirts, 387 Pa. 291, 127 A. 2d 706 (1956); Mack v. Reading Company, 377
Pa. 135, 103 A. 2d- 749 (1954); Eckman v. Bethlehem Steel Company, 387
Pa. 437, 128 A. 2d 70 (1956).
32 Other cases in accord: PufFinbarger v. Day, 24 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1962);
Dodson v. Pohle, 73 Ariz. 186, 239 P. 2d 591 (1952); Myer v. St. Paul-
Mercury Indemnity Co., 225 La. 618, 61 So. 2d 901 (1952); Vonault v.
O'Rourke, 97 Mont. 92, 33 P. 2d 535 (1934).
33 230 Iowa 181, 297 N. W. 301 (1941).
34 A similar result was reached in the 1962 decision 6fLagerpusc h v. Lind-
ley, 115 N. W. 2d 207 (Iowa, 1962). In his allegations of complaint- for the
wrongful death of his wife, plaintiff charged that defendants negligently
failed to diagnose and treat decedent. The court rejected the doctrine and
denied recovery. Neither the doctor nor the hospital was in full control of
the instrumentalities involved. They could deal with the body of plaintiff's
wife, but they had no control over her physical frailties, allergies, reactions,
or idiosyncrasies.
Jan., 1964
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An illustration of the control element in dentistry cases is
set forth in an Illinois decision where a dentist was removing a
decayed tooth and part of it went down the patient's throat.3 5
The court rejected the theory. To say that the doctor had com-
plete control of either the tooth or the mouthpack would be
carrying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur too far. A mishap such
as the flying of a fragment of tooth or filling into a patient's
throat while the tooth is being extracted is not of itself evidence
of negligence or want of skill on the part of the doctor.36
A distinctive class of cases involving injuries to unaffected
areas of a patient's body are those resulting from the administra-
tion of anesthetics or other drugs. The fact that a patient dies
while under the influence of an anesthetic will not alone invoke
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.3 7
In a Massachusetts case, it was held that the mere fact that
a patient suffered an injury to her eyes by the administration of
ether during an operation for a throat ailment does not alone
warrant the inference of fault on the part of the surgeon in ad-
ministering the ether.38 Likewise, the doctrine was inapplicable
where it was alleged that defendant, in undertaking to induce a
condition of local anesthesia, used a quantity of liquid containing
a high percentage of some caustic and deleterious chemical, caus-
ing a blister and resulting in an infection.39
The mere fact that a needle or other instrument broke during
use by a physician, surgeon, or dentist in treatment of a patient
is insufficient to invoke the doctrine. This is especially true
where defendant did not manufacture the needle or other instru-
ment which broke, and there was nothing tending to indicate any
defect.40
In Tady v. Warta,4 1 it was held that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur was inapplicable in an action against a physician for
35 Bollenback v. Bloomenthal, 341 Ill. 539, 173 N. E. 670 (1930).
36 See Hazard Hospital Co. v. Comb's Admr., 263 Ky. 252, 92 S. W. 2d 35
(1936). In this case a child's tooth was knocked out during an operation
for a tonsillectomy. The tooth lodged in the child's lung, and the child died.
In denying recovery, the court rejected the doctrine.
37 Hasemeier v. Smith, 361 S. W. 2d 697 (Mo. 1962). Annot., 162 A. L. R.
1320 (1946). See, Wasmuth, Standards of Care in Anesthesiology, 7 Clev-
Mar. L. R. 403 (1958).
38 Klucken v. Levi, 293 Mass. 545, 200 N. E. 566 (1936).
39 Lippard v. Johnson, 215 N. C. 384, 1 S. E. 2d 889 (1939); Gillen v. U. S.,
281 F. 2d 425 (9th Cir. 1960).
40 Annot., 162 A. L. R. 1321 (1946).
41 111 Neb. 521, 196 N. W. 901 (1924).
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alleged negligence in breaking off the point of a chisel while
treating a bone infection and leaving the broken point imbedded
in the bone. Breaking of the instrument might have been caused
by a defect therein, by use of too much force, by negligence of
defendant, or by a mere accident. The evidence pointed to no
one of these possibilities in preference to the other.
Another rejection of the doctrine in dentistry is reported in
an Indiana case.42 Plaintiff brought an action against the dentist
for alleged negligence in breaking a hypodermic needle and
allowing it to remain in plaintiff's jaw. The court said that res
ipsa loquitur was not applicable in the absence of evidence that
the needle was defective, not of a type commonly used by den-
tists, used in a careless or negligent manner, or not used accord-
ing to the usual practice of skilled dentists. There was also a
total lack of evidence by lay or expert witnesses that defendant
was negligent in inserting the needle into the jaw of the plain-
tiff.43 Likewise, in another dentistry case in Missouri where
plaintiff brought an action against defendant for injuries sus-
tained when a hypodermic needle broke off in plaintiff's gum,
the doctrine was rejected. The court stated that to allow plain-
tiff to go to the jury on the theory of res ipsa loquitur under
such evidence would allow the jury to determine the question of
negligence upon pure speculation and conjecture.44
In an Ohio decision the defendant doctor, in administering
a spinal anesthetic, forced the needle into the bony structure of
the plaintiff's spine and caused the needle to break. The court
held that the breaking of the needle under the circumstances,
coupled with its location outside of the channel of soft tissues
and against the bone gave rise to a prima facie case of negligence,
sufficient to call upon the defendant for explanation. In its opin-
ion the court noted, however, that breaking of the needle, alone,
did not permit application of res ipsa loquitur.45
In a recent article46 extension of the doctrine in medical mal-
practice cases by California courts was severely criticized. The
42 Robinson v. Ferguson, 107 Ind. App. 107, 22 N. E. 2d 901 (1939); See also
Smith v. McClung, 201 N. C. 648, 161 S. E. 91 (1931); Ernen v. Crofwell, 272
Mass. 172, 172 N. E. 73 (1930).
43 See Note, 26 Va. L. R. 919 (1940).
44 Mitchell v. Poole, 229 Mo. App. 1, 68 S. W. 2d 833 (1934).
45 Wiley v. Wharton, 68 Ohio App. 345, 41 N. E. 2d 255 (1941).
46 Adamson, Medical Malpractice: Misuse of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 46 Minn.
L. R. 1043 (1962).
Jan., 1964
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function of the doctrine in California is to obviate the basic re-
quirement that plaintiff prove by direct or opinion evidence that
a negligent act or omission occurred and that the injury resulted
therefrom. It is predicated on the theory that the patient's in-
juries might be the result of some unknown malpractice. When
the court decides that the doctrine is applicable, plaintiff may go
to the jury without evidence of any particular act or omission
and without expert evidence as to whether the unknown act or
omission was malpractice, and without expert evidence that the
act or omission caused the injuries. California seems to reason
backwards from an unintended result to malpractice. Therefore,
such decisions may amount to finding liability without fault.
4 7
The author of the article cited referred to the doctrine in
California as a declaration of public policy in disguise. As med-
ical men are too close-mouthed, it suggests, a physician shall be
treated like a common carrier and be liable for a bad result un-
less the jury exonerate him. He urged that the doctrine be recog-
nized for what it is and rejected. 48
The statute of limitations, of course, is a defense to res ipsa
that should be mentioned.
49
Numerous vices are inherent in a distortion of the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine. 50 First, it is unfair to the jury in professional
liability cases in that the members are not equipped with the
medical education and assistance they require to arrive at a fair
judgment. Second, the physician, surgeon or dentist may be sub-
jected to a verdict based on sympathy and speculation. It would
seem that the physician, as a professional man licensed by the
state and dedicated to high ethical standards, should be entitled
to the presumption that he has exercised reasonable care rather
than the contrary as imposed by the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.
47 Id. at 1053.
48 Id. at 1055.
49 See, Borgia v. City of N. Y., 12 N. Y. 2d 151, 187 N. E. 2d 777 (1962), citing
many cases; Baum v. Turel, 206 F. Supp. 490 (D. C. N. Y. 1962). But not as
to claim for loss of consortium, Conway v. Ogier, 184 N. E. 2d 681 (Ohio
App. 1961).
50 Stetler, Medical-Legal Relations-The Brighter Side, 2 Villa. L. R. 487
(1957).
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